I read an interesting argument that suggests that the war in the Ukraine is the consequence of expansion of NATO, causing Russia to feel threatened and therefore needing to act. The expansion of NATO came about as a move made by the US (probably the armamments lobby wanting expansion, more guaranteed sales) after the presidency of Bush. Clinton's administration decided to move towards adding old Warsaw Pact countries to NATO. 1998 saw Senate approval for Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary to be invited to join.The significant warning came from George Kennan in 1998 in reaction to this proposed expansion, saying that this was a bad mistake because it changed Russian perceptions of NATO and, therefore, would reignite the cold war (a mixed metaphor). As he said at the time, no-one was threatening anyone else; this moved that reasoning. Essay 385 relates.
Of course, that's not the whole of the story. The hope was that Gorbachev and then Yeltsin would move Russia toward western ideals. Putin is old school, also clearly seeking confrontation and seeking to ally with China, North Korea and other authoritarian regimes (so perceived) in what is possibly seen by themselves as seeking to preserve that very autocracy. Historic names list below, at [5]
The issue that the West has with Russian attitudes is that they treat nations as independent states; if Finland wants to join NATO, it is Finland's choice to make an application. The members of NATO might have opinions about membership, but Russian opinions are irrelevant (to NATO members). Yet, if Russia feels very threatened, enough to steal the Crimea and to invade Ukraine, perhaps such considerations matter. That doesn't give Russia any say in membership, but there perhaps ought to be (and to have been) some sensible active diplomacy and attempts to understand. I suspect that the problem in both Moscow and Washington is that the military manufacturers want more and the military in both nations seeks justification for their existence – and for the vast spend. Wikipedia tells us that about half of Russians see US/NATO as responsible for the Ukraine crisis. With over 750 references, the wiki article exhibits depth.
[1] https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/feb/28/nato-expansion-war-russia-ukraine
[2] https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/aug/11/ukraine-proposal-west-security-guarantee-budapest-memorandum refers to the failure of the Budapest memorandum.
[3] https://www.statista.com/chart/26674/european-countries-by-year-of-joining-nato/ Chart from here.
[4] https://www.statista.com/statistics/262742/countries-with-the-highest-military-spending/ miitary spending. I've emboldened Russia, the USA and the UK.
In billions of dollars: USA 801, PRChina 293, India 77, UK 68, Russia 66, France, Germany and Saudi Arabia 56. The aggregated EU spending would make them comfortably third.
In GDP terms, that order is quite different: Saudi 6.6%, Russia 4.1%, USA 3.4%, Israel and S Korea 2.8%, India 2.7% Iran 2.3%, UK 2.2% Australia and France 2%, PRChina 1.7%. This suggests that EU spending is around the 1% mark. The figures are not static; China has shown a leap over the last decade, while the US has decreased spend. See the Statista site.
[5] Leaders of Soviet Russia
- Joseph Stalin (May 6, 1941 — March 5, 1953)
- Georgy Malenkov (March 5, 1953 — September 7, 1953)
- Nikolai Bulganin ( September 7, 1953 - March 27, 1958)
- Nikita Khrushchev (March 27, 1958 — October 14, 1964)
- Leonid Brezhnev (October 14, 1964 — November 10, 1982)
- Yuri Andropov (November 12, 1982 — February 9, 1984)
- Konstantin Chernenko (February 13, 1984 — March 10, 1985)
- Mikhail Gorbachev (March 11, 1985 — December 25, 1991)
Presidents of Russia (1991–present)
- Boris Yeltsin (July 10, 1991 — December 31, 1999)[8] Yeltsin moved Russia to a non-soviet position, technically, democracy.
- Vladimir Putin (May 7, 2000 — May 7, 2008)[9] Putin was Prime Minister while Medvedev was President.
- Dmitry Medvedev (May 7, 2008 — May 7, 2012) Medvedev was Prime Minster 2012-20
- Vladimir Putin (May 7, 2012 – Present) Prime Minister is Mishustin, 2020 onwards
By early October there have been sham referendums and Russia claims great chunks of what was Ukraine a year ago (a week ago). The UN rejects these claims, Putin threatens nuclear weapons and the West as a whole has soon to decide that either there IS a line crossed or to accept that Putin's tactics work (and thence, his strategy). The things we call sanctions (a contranym) hurt us more than him; we see no easy way the population of Russia will cause change to occur, though his call for mobilisation (calling up the troops) may move that significantly nearer. Ukraine forces have reclaimed chunks of the places now declared to be Russia and I think what we need to see is the border returned to where it was. In which case, we have to wonder about the Crimea too, or at least for long enough to hold a referendum that the West trusts to have been reasonably honest and accurate. War crimes abound and we have no understandable way of any calling to account unless the Russians themselves do that. The West is seen to be weak (in military Russian eyes, possibly far wider). We want that gas, any gas, more gas and here we are facing an opportunity to move dramatically to a point where Russian fossil fuels are an irrelevance and hence, Russia too could become an irrelevance to Europe economically. What is clear over here is that we are in practice funding both sides of this unnecessary conflict. Of course, within Britain we could do quite a bit more in clearing house by denying the non-resident foreign owners their purchased properties. We could have sorted this decades ago and it is (beginning to be) seen as evidence of long-term collusion and corruption in high places. Which has produced no election-style promises from non-Tory politicians. Do I remember David Cameron talking about this and, if so, might his memoirs cover how it was that he was stopped from any positive progress on London becoming the money-laundering capital of the world?
Later, perhaps November...
As the Ukraine conflict straggles into its ninth month (counting from 20220224, we've passed 250 days) it is clear to all that this is not going to come to any easy end. It is still unclear what the Russian objectives really are. The latest retreat from Kherson sets the Dnieper river as the border and I have already wondered if this is (was always) an objective. I'd like to think that, whatever Russia says, the borders will return to their previous positions (return to their previous state is a two-edged phrase) with the Crimea left as an unknown. I think allowing any change of ownership was a mistake and indicates that Russia is a pariah nation. The Wikipedia entry reads as comprehensive. And yes, I donated again. Interesting map, kept updated.
Debating points: does the Ukraine war indirectly weaponise energy? Does it weaponise food security? Is sovereignty of Ukraine the issue? Has any state any right to invade another? Do sanctions succeed in their objectives?
I see a fundamental issue being one of sovereignty, but with Russia and Ukraine providing 30% of the world's wheat and barley exports (source) a fifth of the maize and over half of sunflower oil, many countries are hit hard by the loss of imports. On oil and gas, Russia simply sells elsewhere, to India and China rather than Europe. Sanctions listed. It seems that funding the war has been helped, on the Russian side, by rising global prices; Oil sales make up 40% of Russia's total exports. David Fyfe, chief economist at research organisation Argus Media, says its crude oil revenues rose 41% over the past year. Conversely, the sanctions make it difficult for Russia to acquire the high-tech elements of its military hardware. I suggest that, in the same way that the conflict drives Europe to reduce its demand for gas, so the sanctions push Russia toward independence on technical military matters (or they'll ask the Chinese). Hopefully, the lead time to productivity is enormous. Meanwhile, the prediction is that the Russian economy will shrink (source) and that inflation will rise (more than in Britain for both of these), with corresponding drops in trade. Allied with all this, the Moscow Exchange has (already) dropped by a third, most of which occurred shortly after the invasion began, end of February 2022. The Russian market has since dropped further, to around 40% of the value at the start of February. These consequences are slow to cause significant effect and will matter (in my view) only if they last longer than the conflict as a whole. Though I'd see a total return to status quo ante as an excuse for foreign investors to try to leap in to return to their previous advantageous positions.
Greed trumps, in humans.
DJS 20221117 and earlier
Related pages:
§395.3 NATO going North (this page)